Спустя некоторое время после того, как Владимир Зеленский заявил, что украинских переговорщиков используют в качестве прикрытия для заключения закулисной сделки с Москвой, появились сообщения, подтверждающие, что президент Трамп принял решение разрешить России продавать дизельное топливо. ...
Сообщение Planet-Today.com. Перевод заголовка и краткого описания выполнен автоматически.
Hours after Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukrainian negotiators were being used as a smokescreen for a backroom deal with Moscow, reports confirmed President Trump had decided to let Russia sell diesel. The trigger, according to a U.S. official, was Kyiv ignoring repeated requests to stop hitting Russian oil refineries. The volumes sound large. The actual fuel is smaller. The political signal is clearer.
How the Deal Took Shape
The background is straightforward and public. Ukrainian drones have hit Russian refineries for months. Those strikes reduced Russian diesel output and helped push Moscow to ban most diesel exports starting 8 July 2026, a ban later extended through October. Global diesel markets were already tight from the Iran conflict and reduced Middle East flows. U.S. diesel prices stayed near record highs into early October.
Trump had asked Zelensky, in public and through envoys, to stop the refinery attacks. A U.S. official with direct knowledge told Axios that Zelensky ignored about half a dozen such requests. The official said: “Zelensky is misreading the room. By continuing to hit refineries, he is eroding the good will that he has built with Trump over the last six months.”
Zelensky’s counter was also on the record. He told Trump, Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner that Ukraine would stop hitting Russian refineries if Russia stopped hitting Ukrainian power plants. According to the same U.S. official, Trump did not accept that as a fair swap. He wanted Kyiv to stop unilaterally. The official added: “The attacks on the refineries cause pain in Russia, but it causes pain for the U.S., too.”
On Friday, 9 October, Ukrainian negotiators sat for roughly eight hours in Miami with Witkoff and Kushner. They were told Trump was expected to call Putin and lift sanctions on Russian diesel because the strikes were affecting U.S. consumers. A Ukrainian official later claimed the envoys raised the possibility of cutting intelligence sharing if Kyiv kept ignoring the requests. The U.S. official denied any such threat, saying the envoys only reminded Ukraine that Washington supplies munitions and intelligence and that actions should not hurt American consumers. Both versions are now in the public record. Readers can weigh which description better matches the tone of the talks.
Trump then posted on Truth Social that after a “highly successful discussion” with Putin, Russia would immediately supply over 300,000 tons of diesel to American and global markets, another 500,000 tons in November, 1 million tons thereafter, and up to 3 million more “within a short period of time,” depending on the condition of Russian refineries. Minutes later the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License 135. It authorizes the sale, delivery, and importation (including into the United States) of Russian-origin diesel until 7 April 2027. This is the first diesel waiver since the war began to last longer than the usual 30 days. EU and UK sanctions remain unchanged, so Europe cannot legally buy the fuel.
Zelensky’s reaction was immediate. In statements reported by Politico and in an interview with Axios he called the timing “not fair and not honest,” described the Ukrainian team as a “smokescreen,” and labeled the move “a weak decision by strong partners” and a “happy birthday present for Putin,” who had turned 74 earlier that week. He argued it would put more money into the war. See also our earlier note on the temporary window: US Opens Temporary Window for Russian Diesel Until April 2027.
The Arithmetic: Days of Fuel, Not a Flood
Convert the numbers to barrels. One metric ton of diesel is roughly 7.45 barrels. The “immediate” 300,000 tons equal about 2.2 million barrels. Recent U.S. distillate product supplied (the usual proxy for domestic diesel and heating-oil demand) has run near 3.6–4 million barrels a day. October’s first tranche covers roughly half a day of American demand if it all landed in the United States. Adding November and December brings the first 1.8 million tons to roughly 3–3.5 days. Even if the full conditional 4.8 million tons arrive, that is under nine days of U.S. consumption. Trump’s own post said the fuel goes to the “American and Global Marketplace,” so the U.S. share will be smaller.
For scale, the Omsk refinery that Ukraine struck on Thursday produced roughly 8 million tons of diesel in 2024. That is about 670,000 tons a month. The entire November tranche is less than one month of output from a single plant that was on fire the day before the announcement. Industry analysts quoted in the Financial Times noted that Russian refineries are running at about 60 percent of capacity because of the strikes. Michelle Brouhard of Kpler put the practical question bluntly: Russia does not have an export problem; it has a refinery problem. Rapidan Energy’s Bob McNally added that Moscow had already been leaning toward a slight easing of its own export ban for logistical reasons. The six-month waiver may therefore have bought barrels Russia was already preparing to sell, or barrels it still cannot fully produce.
There is a further market wrinkle. The headline knocked diesel prices relative to crude while freight costs sit at records. Some analysts warned that negative refining margins could reduce runs in Asia, which would remove diesel from the market rather than add it. Diesel futures in New York Harbor fell about 4–4.5 percent on the news; WTI crude also eased. Hedge funds had already sold large amounts of gasoil in the week through late September. Part of the “relief” was therefore priced in before Friday’s post. Room for a sustained further drop is limited if the barrels do not appear.
Why Russia Cannot Easily Spare the Fuel
Moscow banned diesel exports on 8 July after the drone campaign produced domestic shortages and long queues at pumps in multiple regions. The ban was extended more than once and was still in force through 31 October at the time of the call. The International Energy Agency and market trackers have estimated Russian diesel output down roughly 30 percent from pre-strike levels. Putin has therefore promised to export fuel that his own government has been holding inside the country to avoid shortages for Russian motorists, farmers, and the military. That promise is either unusually generous or unusually cheap. The volumes and the refinery damage suggest the second reading is more plausible until tankers actually load.
Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak confirmed the same stepped volumes Trump announced. The Kremlin readout was more general: Russia reaffirmed readiness to supply oil and oil products to American and world markets, without firm dates. Something to watch in 2027, perhaps, if the license is still active and the plants are running.
Both Sides of the Symmetry Argument
The core disagreement is about what counts as equal pain. From the U.S. official’s reported view, Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries tighten a global diesel market that American truckers, farmers, and households already feel at the pump. Russian strikes on Ukrainian power plants do not raise U.S. diesel prices in the same direct way. Therefore the attacks are not equivalent, and Kyiv should stop unilaterally while talks continue. The same official said Putin “is open to a discussion on ending the war” and that Washington wants “a new proposal that will be good enough for him.”
From Zelensky’s stated view, an energy ceasefire only makes sense if it is mutual. Stopping Ukrainian pressure on Russian refining capacity while Russia continues to hit Ukrainian power, heat, and water systems simply transfers the cost of the war onto Ukrainian civilians while giving Moscow revenue. He has said he would support sanctions relief if it were tied to a real halt in attacks on energy facilities on both sides. In the absence of that, the diesel waiver looks like a unilateral gift timed to a birthday and to American domestic politics. A senior Ukrainian official told the Financial Times that long-range drone strikes on Russian energy facilities will continue: “We will burn [Russian] refineries.”
Both arguments can be stated without distortion. American voters feel diesel prices every week. Ukrainian cities feel power cuts every week. The practical question is whether one side’s domestic political calendar is allowed to set the terms for the other’s wartime tactics, and whether the resulting volumes of fuel are large enough to justify the diplomatic cost.
The Midterms and the Price Signal
Diesel prices have been a political problem for months. AAA’s national average sat near $6.23 a gallon on Friday, only modestly below the recent record. Goldman’s political economists have noted that gasoline (and by extension diesel) prices and the Democratic generic ballot have moved together this year. Democrats lead the generic ballot by roughly 9 points in recent averages. Inflation and the economy rank high for voters, and the administration’s net approval on both remains negative. Prediction markets have priced a roughly 65 percent chance of a Democratic sweep and a low single-digit chance that Republicans keep the House.
Against that backdrop the sequence is coherent: earlier red-dye diesel waivers, threats of a U.S. diesel export ban, a decision not to strike Iran before 3 November, and now the Russian diesel announcement. JPMorgan’s market desk has described diesel, not crude, as the more important short-term inflation signal. A Friday afternoon dip in the futures market produces a usable headline for the pump-price chart. Whether the physical barrels follow is a separate question that will be settled in New York Harbor and European ports over the coming weeks, not in Truth Social posts.
The risk for the White House is that the next Ukrainian drone that hits a Russian refinery is now hitting a supply chain the president has publicly put his name on. Expect a sharp public response if that happens. The risk for Kyiv is that continued strikes give Washington a ready explanation for any renewed rise in U.S. diesel prices. Both incentives are now visible.
What the Call Did Not Produce
During the 90-minute call Putin declined to commit to resuming talks with Ukraine. Kremlin adviser Yuri Ushakov said Ukrainian strikes on Moscow and other cities during Russia’s parliamentary elections had “thwarted the possibility of an immediate resumption of the negotiation process.” He added that the president said they would think about when negotiations could resume. That is the classic non-answer that usually precedes more non-answers. Witkoff and Kushner may still travel to Moscow and Kyiv next week; Axios noted it is unclear how Friday’s exchange will affect those plans.
The deal therefore sits on three soft foundations at once: a six-month U.S. license, a Russian promise to export fuel its own ban and damaged plants make hard to spare, and an explicit Ukrainian statement that the strikes will continue. The most likely near-term outcome is a tanker or two, another drone strike, mutual blame, and a quiet fade of the headline. Until the physical fuel appears, the main product of the announcement is a short-term price signal and a clear warning to Kyiv that future American inflation complaints can be pinned on Ukrainian tactics.
Readers who want the primary documents can start with OFAC General License 135 (9 October 2026), Trump’s Truth Social post of the same day, the Axios reporting of 10 October that quotes the U.S. official, and Zelensky’s statements carried by Politico and Axios. The market math uses standard barrel-per-ton conversion and recent EIA distillate product-supplied figures. None of those sources claim the volumes will transform the global balance. They only claim a temporary legal opening and a political decision.
Original source note: Analysis draws on reporting of 9–10 October 2026, principally Axios (“U.S. official: Trump cut deal with Putin after Zelensky ignored his requests”), Politico, public statements by both presidents, and the OFAC license text. Full link to key Axios report: https://www.axios.com/2026/10/10/trump-zelensky-putin-diesel-deal-war.
Disclaimer for fact-checkers: This piece relies on named public documents (OFAC General License 135, presidential statements) and on-the-record reporting by established outlets that cite a U.S. official with direct knowledge and Ukrainian officials. Anonymous-source claims are attributed as such. Volume calculations use standard industry conversion factors and publicly available demand data. Readers are invited to check the primary license, the Truth Social post, and the linked news reports themselves. No claim is made that any single source is infallible; the arithmetic and the sequence of events are open to verification.
